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In the Supreme Court

of the State of Utah
w. A. NIELSON,

I

Plaintiff and R-espondent.
vs.
JOHN \V. S:\IITH, AND J. CAMERON
SMITH, E. LINCOLN SMITH, POLLY
SliiTH, JOHN "\V. SMITH and MAX
GAILEY, Trustees of the Smith Land No.6199
Company, and SMITH LAND · COMp Al\TY, a Corporation,
·
Defendants and Appellants.
ALBERTS. WHEELWRIGHT, Trustee
in Bankruptcy of John ·w. Smith,
Bankrupt, Intervenor and Respondent,
AND

S~IITH

~1)

CO:MPANY, a CorPlaintiff and Appellant,
poration,
vs.
:M: M. JOHNSON, Receiver of NielsonBurton Company, Formerly a Co-Partnership, Composed of A. J., Nielson and
Pharles .S. Burton, CHARLES D.
'MOORE,'WILS~ A. NIELSON,
Defendants and Respondents.

No. 6198

Brief of Respondents W. A. Nielson, and
Albert S. Wheelwright Trustee in Bank·
~ptcy of John W. Smith, Bankrupt
We ·have carefully examined and considered
the so-ealled statement of facts which covers the
first thirteen pages of appellants' brief. As we
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view it, the issues in these cases are clear cut and
simple. The so-called statement of facts as s.et out
is very argumentative, confusing and we think misleading and is not a statement but rather an attempted justification of the deliberate and studied
plan and purpose of John W. Smith to defraud his
creditors and his studied acts in carrying out this
purpose.
The two cases present but one issue, that is,
did the acts of John W. Smith in transferring his
property amount in law to a transfer in fraud of
creditors and incidentally was the cause of action
resulting from such acts barred by the statute of
limitations and further as incidental to the main
issue, does the decree rendered herein conform to
the established practice in such cases 1 With this
general observation, we shall briefly state the fact~
as presented by the record.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1930 John W. Smith was the owner of
approximately 473 acres of land in Box Elder
County and 180 shares of the stock of the Pocatello
Valley Pipe Line Company and some other prop·erty, subject to an obligation to pay the balance
of the purchase price of the land. The property
stood of record in Box Elder County in the name
of the seller, the contract of sale having been entered into by M. M. Johnson as receiver of NielsonBurton Company, a co-partnership.
In 1929 Wilse A. Nielson recovered a judgment
against John W. Smith in the District Court of the
Third Judicial District, in the amount of $1278.92,
which judgment was docketed in the District Court
of Box Elder County on September 14, 1929. On
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3
tered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, vVilse A.
Nielson, and against John \V. Smith for $54.90.
On the 16th day of ..:-\.ugust, 1930, the District
Court for Box Elder County entered a judgment
in favor of Bertha K. Skeen against John vV. Smith
for the sum of $100.00, being a judgment for costs
awarded on the affirmance by this Court of a previous judgmE>nt by the Di.::trict Court for Box Elder
County. This latter judgment was, prior to the
filing of the instant case, assigned by Bertha K.
Skeen to \\ibe ~\.. Nielson and at the time of the
filing of this complaint, \\ilse A. Nielson was the
owner of all three judgments. This case, being rPferred to as the Box Elder case, was filed in the
District Court for Box Elder County on July 9,
1935.
On October 5, 1935, John W. Smith filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy listing certain assets,
but not listing the real estate or water stock in
question. In his schedules John W. Smith, bankrupt, liRted as his only creditors Bertha K. Skeen
and Wilse A. Xielson, the plaintiff in this case, and
listed as the only claims against hip! the three
judgments above described.
These judgments
appear in his schedules as certified by the bankruptcy court to this Court in support of a motion to
abate, at page 022 of the transcript as follows:
:Name of
\Vh{'re and
Name and
CrPCiitors and
\Yh~n
Nature of
Addresses
•Contracted
Debt
--~~~~--~-~~~~~-!-----------Judg!ffi.ent
·W. A. Nielson. Brigham City
Tremonton
Utah.
· entered in
City Court.
Utah.
May 22, 1930
.Judgme.nt
Bertha K. Skeen. Brigham City,
entered in
Salt Lake. City, Utah.
District Court
187 A Street
August 16, 1930. Judgment made
W. A. Nielson, Salt Lake.
an~ enter~d. in
Tremonton
'County
Third JudiCial
Utah.
·
i Sent. 29. 192!). 1 District. Salt
1
•Lake County

Amount

-----$

54.90

$ 100.00

$1278.92
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An adjudication in bankruptcy was immediately made and Albert S. Wheelwright, intervenor,
was duly elected trustee in bankruptcy and immediately qualified and entered upon his duties as
such. In 1930 the judgments enumerated appeared
on the judgment docket in Box Elder County. On
October 7, 1930, after the said judgments were
entered against him, John W. Smith caused the
Smith Land Company to be incorporated with its
principal place of business at Brigham City, Utah,
and transferred all of the property then owned by
him, including his rights in the real estate and water
·stock above described to the Smith Land Company in full payment for the total 10,000 shares of
its capital stock. The incorporators were all members of the immediate family of John ·w. Smith.
~heir names and the amount subscribed is as follows:
John W. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,000
J. Cameron Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,000
C. Vivian Smith .................. 1,700
E. Lincoln Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 1,500
Polly Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... 1,000
John W. Smith, trustee ........... 2,799
Max Gailey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
The contract to purchase the real estate here
involved in which John W. Smith was buyer was
assigned to the corporation but the assig11ment was
not recorded in the office of the county recorder.
The stock as taken by John W. Smith was, distributed around among members of his family.
There was no apparent change of ownership of the
real estate; there was no record change of the
ownership and John W. Smith continued to occupy
and operate the property consisting of a dry farm
ranch, the same as before the assignment and up
the time
of Funding
the filing
ofprovided
this byaction,
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and rents therefrom and paying them on account
of the balance of the purchase price.

In 1931 the Sn1ith Land Company failed to pay
the corporation tax and its charter was forfeited
and continued as forfeited until after this action
was filed, when it was reinstated.
In the bankruptcy proceeding no property nor
exemption was listed, and .AlbertS. ·Wheelwright a~
trustee, did not receive any money or other property, but asserted the right to the real estate and
all interests of John\\. Smith in it at the time the
petition in bankruptcy was filed and claimed the
right to administer that property as a part of the
bankruptcy estate, to the exclusion of the bankrupt
and the corporation.
M. M. Johnson as receiver of Nielson-Burton
had deeded the land, subject to the contract of sale
with John W. Smith, to C. D. :Moore. C. D. Moore
claimed the right, as agaj.nst John W. Smith and
the Smith Land Company and WheelwrigliT as
trustee, to forfeit this contract because of its default. 1'lilse A. Nielson, in order to protect against
such forfeiture, purchased the rights of C. D. :Moore
in the contract and in the land and the deed to the
property was recorded in his name in Box Elder
County. Succeeding to the rights of Johnson and
'!foore, Wilse A. Nielson served notice of default
'lpon the bankrupt, the Smith Land Company and
Wheelwright. John VI/. Smith then, acting for him-~elf through the Smith Land Company, tendered to
Wilse A. Nielson the balance of the purchase price
and suit was filed in the name of Smith Land Company against Wilse A. Nielson, Moore, Johnson and
others for a specific performance of the contract
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of sale. This case will be referred to as the Salt
Lake County case.
Albert S. Wheelwright, claiming all the rights
of John W. Smith, filed his complaint in intervention in the Box Elder County case and the case
was carried on by him as trustee· as originally filed
by Nielson as a creditors bill. By stipulation the two
cases were tried together but separate findings and
decrees were entered in each case. In the Box Elder
County case the trial court held and found and.
decreed that the transfer of the real estate and all
interest in it and the water stock of John W. Smith
was made with the intention to hinder, delay and
defraud his creditors and was therefore fraudulent
and void. The court also determined the total
amount then due on the three judgments owned and
held by Nielson and determin~d that there was no
money available to pay the costs of the bankruptcy
proceeding and adjudged the total of these judgments and the amount of costs in the bankruptcy
court, to be a first and prior lien on the ·property
in favor of Albert S. Wheelwright, as trustee in
bankruptcy. The court further found that the
rSmith Land Company was organized as a mere
contrivance and instrumentality by John W. Smith
to accomplish his fraudulent purpose and was his
alter ego. In the Salt Lake County case the court
decreed the conveyance of the property to John W.
Smith and the Smith Land Company by Nielson,
upon the payment to Nielson of the balance of the
purchase price, but subject to the lien of the judgment entered in the Box Elder County eas.e in the
amount found to be the aggregate of all three judgments held by Niel~on and the costs incurred in the
bankruptcy proceeding.
We make brief reference to the pleadings as
presenting the issues on this appeal.
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PLEADINGS -

BOX ELDER COUNTY CASE

The complaint in the Box Elder County case,
as amended, is the ordinary creditors bill. It
alleges the entry and ownership of the judgments
by the plaintiff, the ownership of the property by
John W. Smith, the organization of the Smith Land
Company by John ·"\V. Smith, to whom the property
was transferred for 10,000 shares of stock of the par
value of $1.00 per share, the lapse of the charter
of the corporation during the year following its
organization for failure to pay the corporation tax,
the fact that the transfer to the corporation covered
all property of the defendant, John ·w. Smith; that
he was insolvent and that the transfer was made
with intent to hinder, delay and defraud the creditors of John W. Smith and that the corporation
was holding the property in trust for John W.
Smith and the plaintiff as his creditor; that the
-property at all times stood in the name of the seller
and there was no change in possession or use of
the property and the plaintiff had no notice of the
transfer and the fraud connected therewith until
within three years prior to the filing of the plaintiff's action.
The allegations of this complaint were adopted
by the Trustee in Bankruptcy, Albert S. ·Wheelwright, who, under order of court, filed a compJaint
in intervention and thereafter became the real
plaintiff.
The defendant, John W. Smith, by his answer
as amended, admitted the entry of the judgments
and as to one of them pleaded the statute of limitations. He further admitted that execution had been
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issued and was not satisfied. That he was one of
th~ organizers of the Smith Land Company but denied that it was organized or any transfer was made
with intent to hinder, delay and defraud creditors.
The other defendants, except the Smith Land Company, admitted the ownership of the property in
John W. Smith and in effect denied all other allegations. By an amended and supplemental answer the Smith Land Company alleged, among
other things, the ownership of the real estate in
John W. Smith and his defaults under the contract
to purchase and further alleged that after the
plaintiff's complaint was filed, the corporation
caused its charter to be reinstated and further alleged that if the plaintiff had any cause of action
it was barred by limitation.
The Smith Land Company further alleged
that since the filing of the complaint, Nielson acquired the ownership of the land and the eontract
of sale from M. M. J-ohns.on and served notice of
thEJ forfeiture of the SmitH Land Company, that
the defendant company had tendered the balancp
due on the contract and become entitled to a deed;
that the defendant company had taken possession
of the property and cultivated it and made many
in~tallment payments to the seller and the plaintiff, Nielson, was estopped from denying the owner~hip of the property by the Smith Land Company.
In its previous answer the company had alleged that
ihe plaintiff and his attorney knew of the transfer
of the property by Smith to the corporation at the
tjme and more than three years prior to the inf,titution of the acHon.
These affirmative allegations of the original
and amended and S\lpplemental answer were denied
a reply
by Funding
the plaintiff.
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PLEADINGS -

SALT LAI\:E COUNTY CASE

The complaint of the Smith Land Company,
as amended, is a simple complaint for specific performance against M. ~I. Johnson, as the original
party to the contract of sale, and his successors in
jnterest, including " ..ilse A. Nielson in whom title
was vested at the time the action was filed. The
~~mended answer of "\Vilse A. Nielson admits the
<;riginal contract and Jolm W. Smith, as purcahser,
took possession under the contract and denies generally the other allegations of the complaint. Then,
hy further answer, alleges the pendency of the Box
Elder County case and states further generally
the allegations of the complaint as amended in the
Box Elder County case as above detailed.

FINDINGS AND DECREE COUNTY CASE.

BOX

ELDER

The cases were consolidated for trial but separate findings and decree were entered. In the Box
Elder County case the court found, on all of the
material issues presented to the effect that John W.
Smith was the owner of the property in 1930, subject to the balance of the purchas.e price, and that
the judgments were entered as alleged and admitted by the defendants; that John W. Smith
caused the corporation to be organized as a contrivance to be used in hindering, delaying and defrauding his creditors; and that after transferring
his property to the corporation he was insolvent;
that the effect was to hinder, delay and defraud his
creditors, including the palintiff and that the corporation had no separate existence but was his alter
ego and that upon receiving the stock for the trans-
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fer of all of his property, the stock had been distributed, wholly without consideration, among the
111embers of his family as a further step in his plan
and purpose to hinder, delay and defraud his creditors. That the prope·rty stood of record in the
name of the seller and that no record of the transfer of the property was made in the office of the
county recorder and the plaintiff had no knowledge
of the transfer, or any facts connected therewith
until within three years prior to the filing of the
action. That the plaintiff, Wilse A. Nielson, was
the owner of all three judgments described in the
complaint, aggregating in total the sum of $2529.36;
that in the bankruptcy proceeding Albert S. Wheelwright was the Trustee in Bankruptcy o£ John W.
Sn1ith and that Smith had caused to be deposited
in the Salt Lake City case, as a tender, the balance
of $2433.88 remaining unpaid on the purchase
price; that title to the property and all interest of
.John ·w. Smith therein passed to Albert S. Wheelwright, Trustee in Bankruptcy, subject to the homet:tead rights of John W. Smith. That Albe·rt S.
Wheelwright, as such Trustee in Bankruptcy, had
in due course of the bankruptcy proceedings offered
for sale and sold to Aubrey F. Turley the said
property and all rights of tTohn ·w. Smith therein
and Aubrey F. Turley had paid therefor. That the
plaintiff was the only creditor of John W. Smith
listed or appearing in the bankruptcy proceeding;
that ,John W. Smith had not paid the costs. of the
said bankruptcy proceeding and there had accrued
certain costs and expenses of the bankruptcy proceeding, to pay which there were no funds available.
From this the court concluded that the Smith
Land Company was organized as a vehicle or contrivance
to be
used
and provided
that byitthewas
John
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W. Smith in hindering, delaying and defrauding his
creditors; that the attempted transfer was fraudulent and void to the extent that the property was
n<.cessary to be applied to the complete satisfaction of the said judg1nents and all costs incurred in
ilie bankruptcy proceeding, for which: Albert S.
·wheelwright becmne entitled to a judgment and
first lien on the said property and the whole thereof~ subject to the homestead exemption. The decree
adjudged the assignment and transfer by John ,V.
Smith to the Smith Land Company to be fraudulent
and void and further that upon the payment of too
balance of the purchase price, Albert S. ·Wheelwright was decreed to have a first and prior lien
en the said property in the amount of $2529.36, being the amount of the judgment, with interest, and
also for the additional amount of $1247.19 being the
amount of costs and expenses as determined by
the bankruptcy court in the bankruptcy proceeding; and further decreeing that the judgment bel
satisfied upon the payment, within 60 days, of the
said amounts, in default of which Albert S. Wheelwright would become entitled to proceed to foreclose
his lien upon the said property.

FINDINGS AND DECREE COUNTY CASE.

SALT LAKE

In the Salt Lake County case the court made
findings on aU material issues, following, in effect,
the findings in the other case, as above detailed, and
the court then concluded that Wilse A. Nielson, upon the payment to him of the balance of the purchase price, as tendered, should execute a deed as
cal1ed for by the contract, to John W. Smith and
the Smith Land Company and upon delivery of the
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t:ame, with abstract and water stock, to the county
clerk, the clerk was directed to deliver the check
i c:Ht_lciTd and held by him to vVilse A. Nielson. The
court in this ca:::;e decreed the property to be conveyed ::-;ubject to the lien as fixed and determined
~nd decreed in the Box Elder County case.

ARGUMENT
Twenty-two assignments of error are printed
1n the appellants' abstract. In the brief, appellants discuss only part of these assignments of
error and group them under five separate heads.
Under the rule of this Court, we assurne that all
assig11ments of error not included in the argument
in appellants' brief are waived and we shall give
no attention to them.
' The fundamental question presented by this
appeal is the effect of a transfer by an insolvent
debtor of all of his property to a corporation, organized by him where he takes in exchange all of
it~ stock, as against the rights of existing creditors.

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF
The eases on this subject are rathe,r numerous,
and the majority of them hold, with very little qualification, that where a debtor transfers his property
to a corporation in consideration of the stock of the
eorporation, and receives no other consideration for
the transfer except the stock of the corporation,
the transfer may be considered as fraudulent and
may
set aside
the provided
property
reached
the
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13
hands of the corporation by the creditors of the
debtor so making the transfer.
A leading case on the subject, and a well considered case, is the case of
First National Bank v. F. C. Trebein Company, an Ohio case reported in 52
N.E. 83-±.
In that case Trebein formed a corporation which
was called the F. C. Trebein Company. Prior to
the forming of this corporation, Trebein had been
carrying on a business of buying, selling and milling grain, and in that business he owned two or
three mills, elevators, considerable real estate and
water rights and capital stocks and other personal
property. His personal financial affairs came to
be somewhat involved and he learned that he was
going to become further liable on outstanding notes
which he had endorsed personally for another company. This condition existed in the latter part of
the year 1894. In December of 1894 and January
of 1895, Trebein conveyed real and personal property to his wife to the value of over $40,000.00,
claiming it was in part payment of a prior indebtedness due to the wife. He also transferred real
estate of the value of $2100.00 to his daughter,
claiming it was a fulfillment of a promise of a wed1ding gift he had made some six months previous.
He also pledged a large amount of corporate stocks
to his wife as collateral for a balance of $8700.00
which he claimed was due her over and above the
$40,000.00. The transfer of such property to his
wife and daughter was not involved in the particular
ca8e reported, the Court merely stating that another action was pendingt with regard to those
transfers. After such transfers the defendant, Tre-
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bein, owned real estate and milling property worth
somewhere in the neighborhood of $60,000. On Jan_
uary 22, 1895, he formed a corporation, incorporated
for $60,000, with 600 shares of a par value of
$100.00 each, and conveyed all of his property to
the corporation except that which he had previously
transferred to his wife and daughter. The·re was
some question whether the property transferred to
the corporation was actually wo!th $60,000.00 or
not, but no point was made of that by the court.
Of the 600 shares issued upon the incorporation
of the F. C. Trebein Company, Trebein himself took
596 shares. One share each was issued to his wife,
his daughter, a son-in-law and a brother-in-law, each
of whom paid' $90.00 a share for the one share of
stock delivered to them. Of the 596 shares issued
'to Trebein, he retained one share and p~edg1ed the
balance to three banks as security for notes covering obligations which the banks had previously held
against him.
The same contention was made in that case as
was made by the defendant, John W. Smith, in this
case; that is, that his sole intent and purpose in
forming the corporation was to try and protect his
creditors, and he attempted to prove his. point by
showing that he had pledged practically all of the
Rtcck to his creditors on their obligations. The
same argument was made by John ·w. Smith in
this case, claiming that he gave stock to some of.
his creditors, who were members of his family, and
offered stock to the plaintiff~ Nielson, the only
other creditor still holding obligations against him.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that. regardless
of the fact as to whether he had reallv intended to
Sponsored by the S.J.
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.stock or otherwise, the transfer !operated to hinder
and delay the creditors and the Court said that it
was"clearly satisfied that the conveyance by
Trebein of his property to the corporation
was made to hinder and delay creditors,
and should have been so declared by the
(trial) court and ordered administered for
the benefit of all his creditors, . . . ''
The trial court had considered that Trebein had
acted in good faith and gave judgment in his favor.
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court, saying :
" . . . The court found that this was all
done in good faith. But, in view of the
facts, we are unable to see how the court
could have meant more than that he meant
no wrong by it. Good faith in law, how;ever, is not to be measured always by a
man's own standard of right, but by that
which it has adopted and prescribed as a
standard for the observance of all men in
their dealings with each 'other. When one
conveys all his property to another with
the intention of hindering and delaying his
creditors, or a part of them, in pursuing
their legal remedies againit him and his
property, his conduct in law is deemed
fraudulent, however honestly he may nave
intended to deal with all his creditors in
the future.''
rbe Supreme Court of Minnesota, in
Benton v. Minneapolis Tailg. & Mfg. Co.,
76 N.W. 265, said:
''·We have already stated his financial
condition and that his indebtedness largely
'exceeded his assets. He must have inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tended the necessary consequences of his
own acts. He transferred nearly all of the
goods found in his wholesale store, and all
of the fixtures therein contained, available personal property and about all he
had, and he closed out the business previously carried on, and accepted as full
payment stock shares in a corporation
which was nothing but an experiment and
which shares had no market value whatsoever. He converted his available personal property into that which was much
less available for the payment of his indebtedness; and the transaction had a direct
and immediate tendency to hinder, delay
and defraud his creditors. Further than
this, it was admitted that, of the stock issued
to McLeod, in payment of the property,
h~ immediately turned over shares of the
par value of $5,000 in payment of a note
for the amount held against him by his
mother-in-law, Mrs. Pratt and that soon
afterwards he pledged the balance of his
shares - par value $4,600.00 - with de'"
fendant Ellison as security for a loan of
$1500.00 made by the latter to him. . . .
That he pledged shares having a par value
of more than three times the amount of
money borrowed and that Ellison required
such a pledge, indicate quite clearly that
these gentlemen did not have a very exalted
opinion of the real value. of shares in defendant corporation. Taking into consideration all of the circumstances as they
were shown on the trial . . . it is very
plain that McLeod and Pratt, at least, entered into a conspiracy to hinder, delay
'and defraud McLeod's creditors, organSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
ized the corporation, having that intent
and purpose in mind, and then to complete
and consununate the fraud caused the
g·ood~ and fixtures to be transferred to it,
and the stock shares to be issued in pretended payment. These facts justified the
finding on which "Was rested the order for
judgment against :McLeod, Pratt and the
corporation.''
In the case at bar John W. Smith transferred
every vestige of property of every nature which
he had, including hi~ horses, cows, farm tools, and
everything, the same as McLeod had transferred
his furniture and fixtures previously used in hh;
tailoring business. John W. Smith continued to
!ive upon and occupy the property as his home, the
same as he had done previous to the forming of
the corporation, just as McLeod after the forming
of his corporation continued to do his tailoring
business in the Minneapolis store he had operated
previously. The only conclm·•ion that can possibly
be reached in the case at bar is that the defendant
Smith did a farming business prior to the incorporation and, after the formation of the Smith Land
Company, John W. Smith continued to do the farming business the same as he had done before. It
was simply John W. Smith doing the same busines~
after having attempted to put on a new coat. That
this is true is further emphatically borne out by
the fact that in Smith's own testimony he stated
that he was heavily indebted, his creditors were
pressing him, and he could not go on, and that he
formed the corporation to enable him to go on and
work out. It is further borne out by the fact that
immediately after the forming of the corporation,
lw allowed itf; charter to be forfeited for nonSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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payment of the franchise tax. This testimony is
very clear and shows, beyond any doubt, that
Smith's only purpose in forming a corporation was
to hinder, delay and defraud his creditors in the
collection of their just claims.
Another case which is very instructive on the
points in issue, is the case of
Matchan v. Phoenix Land Investment Company, 198 N.W. 417.
The judgment of the trial court .was affirmed by
the Supreme Court, which stated:
'''Where a corporation has been organized
and used as an instrument of fraud ;
where as here, an individwal has incorporated himself in order to hinder and, if
possible defraud creditors, courts will go
,as far as necessary in disreg1arding the
corporation and its doings in order to
accomplish justice. Such a corporation is
a mere parasitic growth, a mass of fungus,,
which will be lopped off clean whenever
necessary to sound results.
i
1

''The fraudulent organizer of a corporation, intending to conceal his property
from his creditors, cannot disinfect and
immunize his work by admitting to its expected benefits one or more favored ones
among his creditors. The corporation does
not rid itself of guilt or its results simply
by admitting one or· more innocent stockholders. Tha.t would indeed be an easy
and convenient method of perpetrating
fnaud. It is not permissible on any g'round.
Wrongdoers cannot escape justice simply
because their associates are not all b.ad."
(Italics ours.).
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We direct the attention of the Court, .without
further comment, to the following cases:
Colo. Trading Co. v. Acres Comm. Co., 70
Pac. 954.
·
Kellogg v. Douglas County Bank, 48 Pac.
587.

National Bank v. Havens, 156 Atl. 645.
Harris v. First National Bank, 149 Southern 86.
·
,
Lawton v. Allard Realty Co., 168 Southern 768.
Alliance Trust Co. v .. Streater, 161 Southern 168.
Pittsmont Copper Co. v. O'Rourke, 141
Pac. 849.
Bennett v. Minott, 44 Pac. 288.
Paxton v. Paxton, 15 P. (2d) 1051; 80
Utah 540.
.
Zuniga v. Evans, 48 P. (2d) 513; 85 A.L.R.
133; 87 Utah 198.
·
Johnson v. Cook, 146 N .W. 343 (Michigan).
Bourgeois v. Risley Real Estate Comp~ny
88 Atl 199 (New Jersy). '
Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U~ S. 348; 77 L.
Ed. 355.
Planters & ~liners Bank v. Willeo Cotton
·
Mills, 60 Ga. 169.
Kurran v. Rothschild,. 60 Pac. 1111.
Buell v. Rope, 39 N.Y. Sup. 475.

~·

'.

.

·we shall next discuss the homestead exemption. The courts generally have gone to the full extent in recognizing and protecting the homestead
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exemption granted by the Constitution and the statutory proceeding for working it out. :
We assert at the outset that the court here in
this decree has given proper consideration and protection to whatever homestead rights exist. In
order to get clearly before us the manner in which
this question is presented, it is necessary to refer
back briefly to the facts and the findings.
ere can be no claim that notice was given
by reco ing the articles, by analogy to our recording statute
Sections
-1-6 and 78,3, 2, Revised Statutes of
3,
because these sectio refer to conveyance of real
estate which, when ack wledged and recorded, impart notice and provide t t ''subsequent purchas.ers, mortgagees and lien ho ers shall be deemed
to purchase and take with noti . ''
The action was originally brought as a bill in
:equity to set aside the transfer as fraudulent and
;void.
When the defendant, John W. Smith filed his
petition in bankruptcy and the adjudication was
made and the intervenor, Albert S. Wheelwright,
was appointed trustee, ·Wilse A. Nielson ceased to
be an actor in that proceeding. All property rights
of the bankrupt passed to the Trustee in Bankruptcy. For a full discussion of the rights of a
trustee in bankruptcy in such case we direct the
Court to a consideration of
Farkas v. Katz, 54 Fed. (2d) 1061:
''By the challenged transfer, the bankrupt
reserved a substantial benefit to himself;
the transfer resulting in his retaining
complete control of the transferred assets
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and the beneficial owner~hip of a. 98 percent interest in them. A neces&ary t>ffect
of the transfer was to hinder or delay
creditors by putting the transferred assets
beyond the reach of legal process ·in theit·
faFo·r. The bankrupt is presumed to have
intended the necessary or ordinary consequences of his intentional act. The transaction bei:ug in substmwe a transfer by the
bankrupt to himself of substantially all his
assets, and it being presumed that the bankrupt and the porporation dominated by
himself intended to hinder or delay the
former's creditors, the conclusion follows
that the transfer was fraudulent and voidable at the instance of a creditor who did
not consent to it or of the truste-e in bankruptcy when he is appointed.
J. I. Kelley Co. v. Pollock & Bernheimer,
57 Fla 459; 49 So. 934; 131 Am. St.
Hep. 1101.
First Nat. Bank v. F. C. Trebein Co., 59
Ohio St. 316; 52 N.E. 834.
13 R. C .L. 480, 543
"
Also
Volume I, Fletcher Cyc. Corporation Perm.
Edition, page 166, paragraph 44:
''Instances abou..Tld where fraudulent transfers to the hindrance of corporate creditors
were set aside or held invalid, some to rabricated or controlling corporations, on the
strength of this general principle (discussing the proposition that couzts will disregard the corporate entity where necessary
to prevent fraud) . . . . Thus where a corporation is organized or maintained as a
device in order to evade an outstanding
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legal or equitable obligation, the courts,
even without reference to actual fraud, refuse to regard it as a corporate entity.''
Citing numerous cases.
In this same volume at page 48 of the Supplement, are gathered numerous cases and reference
is made to an interesting article on this subject in
32 Michigan Law Review, at page 551.
We quote the following from the Supplement:
'"Corporation formed to defraud creditors.
'Where the corporate form is used by an
individual for the purpose of evading the
law, or for the perpetration of a fraud,
courts will not permit the legal entity to
be interposed so as to defeat justice.'
Trachman v. Trachman, 117 N.J. Eq. 167;
175 Atl. 147."
The following cases consider the rules as to
ignoring the corporate entity under such circumstances.
Isaacson v. Union Trust Company, 275
Pac. 529.
Adams v. Morgan, 52 Pac. (2d) 643.
MoRier v. Lee, 261 Pac. 35.
Security ·Warehouse Company v. Hand,
206 U.S. 415; 51 L. Ed. 1117.
Brown v. Kossove et al, 255 Federal 806_.
Childs v. Stees, 293 Federal 826.
The bankrupt failed and refused to schedule
this property or any interest in it and failed and
refused to claim in his schedules any homestead
exemption in the property. Under the authorities, he thereby waived the homestead right entireSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ly. We direct the Court's attention to the following:
7 Corpus Juris, page 357, Section 627:
'' ( 627) 9. Claim of Exemption - a. N ecessity for. The bankrupt must affirmatively
claim his exemptions in order to be entitled
ihereto in the bankruptcy proceedings.''
.Citing cases.

In re Webb, 219 Federal 349.
In re Barklaw, 282 Federal 892.
In re Moran, 105 Federal, 901:
'• Const. Va., Art. 11, Sec. 1, relating~ to
homestead exemptions, provides that every
householder or head of a family, 'shall be
entitled . . . to hold exempt from levy,'
etc .. property, real or personal, not exceeding in value $2,000. HELD, that such provision merely gives the debtor a privilege
of exemption, and does not create an absolute exemption of any particular property,
which will prevent the title to such property
from vesting in the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy, under Bkr. Act 1898, Sec. 70a, where
the exemption is not claimed in his schedules.''
In re Baughman, 183 Fed. 668.
In re Friedrich, 100 Fed. 284.
Notwithstanding this, however. after Nielson had,
·in. effect, ceased to be the plaintiff and all rights had
passed to Albert S. ·Wheelwright, the trustee, the
defendant, John W. Smith, pleaded his homestead
exemption right in this action, and presented evidence to the effect that by reason of a dependent
daughter living with him, he \Vas the head of a
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excess of the homestead amount, was wholly immaterial on the trial of this case.
We direct the Court's attention to the case of
Crosby v. Anderson, 49 Utah 167; 162
Pac. 75.
fl'he Court said, at page 173 :
''Moreover, under our statute, the appraised value of the homestead, if it is appraised, does not control as is the case in some
jurisdictions, but, under Section 1162,. no
bid can be considered and the homestead
:cannot be sold unless the amount of the
bid exceeds the exemption allowed by the
statute, regardless of what the appraisement may be."
We further urge that the evidence conclusively
shows that the property in ques,tion was of a value
far in excess of the sum of $2300.00, the amount of
exemption found. That is practically without, dispute, though some argument is urged that the testimonYi on this point goes to the value of the
contract rather than to the value of the real es.tate.
But we think, fairly considered, the evidence conclusively establishes that the property at the time
in question was - over and above the balance duf~
on the purchase price- of a value far in excess of
the homestead exemption amount.
Under the finding1s and decree ample provision
is made to fully protect the homestead rights of
,John ·w. Smith, if the determination of the court
that the corporation was but his alter ego and had
no separate existence be overruled, but, on the other
hand, and we think the decision· of the court is
clt arly to this effect and supported by substantial
e\ idence that the corporation was but the alter ego
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of John W. Smith, had no separate existence and
h~ continued in possession and ownerhip of all
property interests under the contract to purchaRe
ail.d must show the conditions existing now or at
the time of the sale of the property as to his right
to a homestead. .A.nd considering the facts in this
light, he is now a single man, not the head of a family and has no homestead exemptions under our
statute. As to the procedure and the time of testing the right and extent and mani;Ler of protecting
the homestead exemption where the property involved is of a \alue in excess of the homestead, we
direct the Court's attention to the case of
Thompson v. R€ynolds, 59
Pac. 516.

Ut~h

416; 205

Every homestead right that the defendant John
"'·Smith has or that of the Smith Land Company
as his granteE, if it is a corporate entity, can be
fuJly protected by the proceeding provided by the
judgment of the trial court.
Our statute provides for full protection of existing homestead rights at the time of sale of the
property on execution by the officer.
Section 38-0-14, 15-16, Compiled Laws,
1933:
"38-0-14. "\Vhen Value Greater Than Exemption. If the homestead selected is of
greater value than is exempted under this
title and consists of two or more separate
pieces of land, the person entitled to the
exemption may select which he will retain
and which shall be partitioned or sold. If
the debtor so elects, the homestead may be·
sold. and after paying thP judgment debtor
the value of the homestead the balance of
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the money shall be applied on the judgment.''
"38-0-15. Id. Sale on Execution. The
homestead shall not be sold if the bid does
not exceed the value of the exemption,
when the homestead is in one piece; but if
the homestead is in more than one piece,
then the officer and the judgment debtor
shall proceed as hereinafter provided to
determine the value of each piece of property claimed as exempt, and no piece shall
be sold unless the bid therefor is~ greater
than the appraised value thereof.''
'' 38-0-16. Id. Appraisal. If the officer
having the execution and the person claiming the exemption cannot agree as to the
value of the homestead, or the partition
thereof, the officer shall select one
appraiser and the person cla.iming1 the exemption another appraiser, both being
householders of the vicinity, to whom the
officer shall administer an oath to fairly
and justly appraise and set apart the exempt property concerning which there is
a disagreement. In case of disagreement
of the appraisers, they shall choo8~ a third
person, who shall also be sworn, and the
decision of any two such appraisers when
made shall be final. The appraisers sliall
report to the officer their appraisal of tlw
property claimed as a homestead. If the
person entitled elects to have the property
partitioned, it shall he the duty of the
appraisers to set apart such homestead as
the person entitled shall select and be entitled to, and the property not set apart as
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homestead shall be subject to sale under
execution.''
Next in argument appellants urge estoppel.
'l'his is a verr far-fetehed idea and we are unable
to understand its application, in any sense, to this
case. As above pointed out, the court has found
that the Smith Land Company was the alter ego of
John W. Smith, that it "Was a fictitious, non-existent
entity, so far as this property was concer~ed, and
used merelv as a convenience and contrivance to
aid John \\;. Smith in completing his fraudulent intent and purpose. But aside from this, where is
there any basis for estoppel as applied to the Trustee in Bankruptcy? Wilse A. Nielson testified, and
this is without dispute, that he never heard of the
corporation until just before he filed the action in
1935. When the petition in bankruptcy was filed
and the trustee appointed, Nielson ceased to have
any interest in the matter, except in the form of a
claim in the bankruptcy proceedlng. The full title
and right vested in the Trustee in Bankruptcyr and
as such he had no dealings with the company. The
dealings between the company and C. D. Moore or
the title holder of the property cannot affect the.
Trustee in Bankruptcy and at the time Wilse A.
Nielson purchased the title to the property and the
right to receive the balance of the purchase price,
be had no standing in the bankruptcy court, except
as a creditor. He had no dealings with the corporation and there is no representation or other
basis for !invoking the doctrine of estoppel and
further there is no element of change of position so
far as the Smith Land Company is concerned, which
would be any basis for estoppel.
Certainly John W. Smith as found to De ~;uL-tv
of the studied plan, purpose and intent and act of
defrauding his creditors, is not in a position to
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urge estoppel and neither Nielson or the Trustee in
Bankruptcy received any benefits or gave any
recognition to the corporation as a basis of estoppel
as against them. In the brief counsel say that
when Nielson served notice of intention to forfeit
the contract, under the terms of the contract he
thereby elected to treat the corporation as the owner
of the property. This, we think, is very farfetched and of no significance at all because the
notice wa.s served upon John W. Smith, it reading,
(Exhibit 1):
"To John W. Smith and to Smith Land
Company, a corporation and to Albert S.
Wheelwright, Trustee in Bankruptcy of
John W. Smith, Bankrupt."
And further we point out that Nielson, at this time,
was in a position, in a sense, adverse to that of the
Trrustee in Bankruptcy. We think it needs no citation of authority to sustain this position.
The next point urged is that of the statute of
limitations. Counsel, in their brief, base their wholr
contention under this head, apparently on the fact
that the plaintiff allegPd the issue of execution and
its return unsatisfied, and do not make a. full statement of the fact which is that th0. return of he
sheriff was not made and was never signed by the
aeputy who handled it and was not filed in court
~and made a public record, even by the sheriff until
after this suit was filed and on the 26th day of June,
1937, as appears in the transcript, page 277.
The uncontradicted evidence and the finding
of the court is that there is no apparent change in
the relation of John ·W. Smith to this property. It
was known that he was buying it under a contract.
The undisputed evidence is that Nielson never heard
of
the assignment or transfer of this contract:
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which appeared nowhere except by way of recital

in the articles of incorporation of Smith Land Company, of which the plaintiff, Nielson, had no knowle<Ioooe until about the time the suit was filed and to
which articles h~ was under no duty in any sense
to look. It is true that knowledge of facts that
would cause a reasonable man to make inquiry
charges him with notice of what such inquiry
would reveal. But nowhere in the evidence is there
any basis for the application of this rule and therefore the authorities cited by counsel have no application. Failing to find any evidence and a.nnarently
in desperation to support their position, counsel in
their brief, at page 31, boldly state:
"It is inconceivable that in the circumstances Nielson did or could have closed
his eyes to the facts which were apparent
on every hand. Under the statute as construed in the following cases the suit was
barred.''
We ask, what circumstances? What facts
were apparent on every hand to put Nielson on
inquiry? We challenge counsel to point out in the
1·ecord any such thing. Neither the circumstances
nor facts exist that would warrant such statement.
It is a mere explanation of hopeless prejudice on
the part of the appellant in an effort to support his
position and without findings of the court that
knowledge or facts or circumstances pointing to
knowledge exist. The question at issue is not
whether the palintiff or Mr. Skeen had notice that
the execution had been returned unsatisfied. The
question involved in this case is whether or not
the plaintiff had notice that the Smith Land Company had been organized and that the defendant
John W. Smith had assigned his contracts and all
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of his property to this corporation without ·any con~
sidera tion.
There .is not a scintilla of evidence in the record· to show. that the sheriff of Box Elder Countv
ever learned that the contract has been assigned t~
this corporation ,or that Mr. Smith transferred hi~
property.
There is not a s.cintilla of evidence that· thE'
sheriff ever attempted to make any levy. This
1
Court knows, that it i~ not unusual for an execution
to he issued and placed in the hands of the sheriff
and for the sheriff to make demand for settlement
1and upon ~he defendant's. r~fusal or neglect to pay,
to return the execution and this is the usual proceedings in the absence of specific directions in
writing to levy upon some particular property.
There is no evidence that the executions which were
is:;ued were any more than demand executions; no
evidence that any demand was made to levy upon
i:his particular property and evmi if there had been,
thP evidence conclusively shows that the defendant
John W. Smith immediately put up ·a supersedeas
bond and had an order staying further execution ,
and further proceedings in the case pending an
appeal to the Supreme Court, and that t:l}.e remit.titur from the Supreme Court affirming the judgment did not .come do,vn until within three years
prior to the filing of this action. The plaintiff, having the supersedeas . bond, and thinking the judgment would be paid, clearly had no duty to make any
investigation or any attempt to collect on his judg-;
ment further and, in fact, was restrained by court,
order from doing so.
Neither is there a scintilla of evidence in this
record to show that the plaintiff, ·w. A. Nielson or
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Mr. D. A. Skeen knew of the organization of the
corporation nor of the transfer of the contract.
They have both testified positively that they did
not know of these facts. There is no contention
that they had any constructive notice from the r~
ords of Box Elder County. No transfer was reOC•rded. There was nothing in the filing of the ar·ticles of incorporation to even put them on inquiry.
There is no statute which makes the filing of the
articles notice and there can be no analogy to the
general recording statute, Sections 78-1-6 and
78-3-2, Revised Statutes of 1933, which statute provides that conveyances of real estate must be
aclrnowledged and recorded and when recorded the
record shall impart notice ''and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and lien holders shall be deemed to purchase and take with notice.''
We submit that the argument of appellant on
this point of the statute of limitations wholly fails
and this point is of no consequence. There was substantial evidence in support of the allegation as to
when the facts on which the fraudulent conveyance
was based were learned and the court so found.
This then completely answers defendants' argument on that point.
Under the next heading "The Judgment As
to Albert S. Wheelwright is Void,'' counsel for
appellant seek to argue for A. F. Turley and apparently predicate their whole case in this regard on
the fact that A. F. Turley was substituted for
Albert S. Wheelwright and therefore the court
could not grant a judgment for Albert S. Wheelwright. The trustee, however, was not dismiss.ed
out of the case, but continued through as a party
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to the case and the final judgment was entered
accordingly.
Under the authorities it was~!cessary to substitute A. F. Turley for Wheelwright, his rights
having accrued after the action was filed and the
intervention made by Albert S. Wheelwright. The
court proceeded with the case, apparently on this
theory and concluded that Wheelwright was entitled to a judgment fixing the lien evidently on the
theory that the rights of A. F. Turley would be
(worked out through the Trustee in Bankruptcy. We
refer the Court to the testimony too of Turley to
the effect that he understood that if he did not get
the property, he would get his money back from the
Trustee in Bankruptcy, to whom he paid it It will
be noted also that the trial court decreed the title
;to the property in question in appellants, subject
io the lien of the plaintiff's judgments and the bankruptcy costs and expenses and gave to the Trustee
in Bankruptcy a lien for this entire amount. Obviously then if the Trustee in Bankruptcy acquired
no title he did not convey title to Turley and Turley was not entitled to judgment but in the bankruptcy proceeding would be entitled to have his.
money refunded. But, aside from this, Turley has
not appealed and this appellant may not challenge
the judgment for him on this appeal. This Court,
in the case of
Sorensen v. Bills, 70 Utah 509; 261 P.
450, page 516
disposed of this point finally when it said:
''The District Court, by its decree, required plaintiff to pay defendant all sums
paid by him to Millard County and all
sums paid by him in redemption of the
drainage
tax for
sale.
No
appeal
is oftaken
byLibrary Services
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plaintiff from this judgment; hence we
must conclude that he is satisfied with it.
In any event, the question is not here for
review, and we are not called upon to determine whether that part of the judgment
of the court was erroneous or not. We are
simply holding that in this case, on the face
of the record as reflected by the stipulation, the defendant has not been injured by
the decree of the court, and was denied no
legal or equitable right in the judgment entered.''
One other point urged, and we have above referred to it, we think with sufficient explanation,
is that the court in working out equity and in order
to protect the rights of Nielson to have his judgments paid in full through the Trustee in Bankruptcy required that as a condition, the Trustee in
Bankruptcy be given a lien, not only for the amount
of the judgments with interest as determined, but
for the amount of such costs as determined by the
bankruptcy court, using the determination maae
by the bankruptcy court as a yardstick in this proceeding. We submit that this is entirely proper
practice and does not in any sense delegate any
jurisdiction or function of the lower court, but
takes as a fact a determination made by the bankruptcy court as a basis for doing complete justic~
in this equity proceeding.
Since this appeal was taken and the record
made up the appellant has served a motion for an
order authorizing the filing in this Court of a copy
of an order of the U. S. District Court in the matter of the bankruptcy of John W. Smith. We take
this opportunity to resist such motion and object
to the filing of any such order as not in accordance
with any recognized practice or proceeding in this
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Court and not in any sense binding upon this Court.
and therefore wholly irrelevant and immaterial.
The cases now before this Court on these appeals
result from a full trial and final decision of the
District Court and are here for review on the record
of that trial only.
We respectfully submit that the motion should
be denied and the judgments of the trial courf
should be in all respects affirmed and this litigation
brought to an end.
Respectfully submitted,

_;(_~ll-.~
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LEROY B. YOUNG,
D. A. SKE,EN,
A. U. MINER,
Attorneys for Respondent ·W. A. Nielson,
and Albert S. Wheelwright, Trustee in
Bankruptcy of John W. Smith, Bankrupt.
1.
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